NEMO Working Group C. Ng
Internet-Draft Panasonic Singapore Labs
Expires: January 10, 2005 J. Hirano
Panasonic
July 12, 2004
Securing Nested Tunnels Optimization with Access Router Option
draft-ng-nemo-access-router-option-01
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This Internet-Draft will expire on January 10, 2005.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2004). All Rights Reserved.
Abstract
Network Mobility (NEMO) Basic Support provides global connectivity to
mobile network through the establishment of bi-directional tunnels
between a mobile router and home agent. However, this sub-optimal
routing, especially when nesting of mobile networks or Mobile IPv6
(MIPv6) host occurs within a mobile network. This memo proposes
using a new mobility header option called the Access Router Option to
allow a mobile node (host/router) to inform its home agent (HA) or
corespondent node (CN) the home-address (HoA) of the access router it
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is currently attached to. From there, this memo lays out a mechanism
that allows mobile nodes to securely achieve nested tunnels
optimization, and even full route optimization.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.1 Terms Used . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.2 Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.3 Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2. Overview of Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.1 Router Advertisement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.2 Binding Update from MR1 to HA1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.3 Binding Update from MR2 to HA1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.4 Forwarding Packets from HA1 to MR1 . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.5 Forwarding Packets from MR1 to HA1 . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.6 Scenario with a Local Fixed Router . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.7 Route Optimization with Mobile Network Hosts . . . . . . . 10
3. Changes to Existing Protocols . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
3.1 Modifications to NEMO Basic Support / Mobile IPv6 . . . . 12
3.1.1 Addition of Access Router Option . . . . . . . . . . . 12
3.1.2 Extending Type 2 Router Header . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
3.1.3 Modification to Conceptual Data Structures . . . . . . 14
3.2 Modifications to IPv6 Neighbor Discovery . . . . . . . . . 15
3.2.1 Addition of New Option in Router Advertisement . . . . 15
3.3 Modifications to ICMPv6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
3.3.1 New Router Global Address ICMP Message . . . . . . . . 16
3.4 Extending the Router Alert Option . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
4. Operation of ARO-Enabled Mobile Routers . . . . . . . . . . . 20
4.1 Operation When Mobile Router is At Home . . . . . . . . . 20
4.1.1 Sending Router Advertisement . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
4.1.2 Processing Outbound Packets . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
4.1.3 Processing Inbound Packets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
4.2 Operation When Mobile Router is Away . . . . . . . . . . . 21
4.2.1 Sending Router Advertisement . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
4.2.2 Receiving Router Advertisement . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
4.2.3 Sending Binding Updates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
4.2.4 Processing Outbound Packets . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
4.2.5 Processing Inbound Packets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
4.3 IPSec Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
4.3.1 IPSec Processing on Inbound Packets . . . . . . . . . 24
4.3.2 IPSec Processing on Outbound Packets . . . . . . . . . 24
5. Operation of ARO-Enabled Home Agents . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
5.1 Receiving Binding Updates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
5.2 Receiving Tunneled Packets from Away Nodes . . . . . . . . 25
5.3 Tunneling Packets to Away Nodes . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
5.4 IPSec Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
5.4.1 IPSec Processing on Inbound Packets . . . . . . . . . 28
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5.4.2 IPSec Processing on Outbound Packets . . . . . . . . . 28
6. Operation of ARO-Enabled Mobile Network Nodes . . . . . . . . 29
6.1 Nested Tunnel Optimization with Home Agent . . . . . . . . 29
6.2 Receiving Router Advertisement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
6.3 Sending Binding Updates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
6.4 Sending Data Packets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
6.5 Processing Inbound Packets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
6.6 IPSec Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
6.6.1 IPSec Processing on Inbound Packets . . . . . . . . . 31
6.6.2 IPSec Processing on Outbound Packets . . . . . . . . . 31
7. Operation of ARO-Enabled Correspondent Node . . . . . . . . . 32
7.1 Receiving Binding Updates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
7.2 Receiving Route Optimized Packets from Mobile Nodes . . . 32
7.3 Sending Route Optimized Packets to Mobile Nodes . . . . . 32
7.4 IPSec Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
7.4.1 IPSec Processing on Inbound Packets . . . . . . . . . 33
7.4.2 IPSec Processing on Outbound Packets . . . . . . . . . 33
8. Design Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
8.1 Considerations in the Use of Mutable Router Alert
Option . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
8.1.1 Overview of Router Alert Option . . . . . . . . . . . 34
8.1.2 Example where an Immutable RAO is Used . . . . . . . . 34
8.1.3 The Need for Mutable RAO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
8.1.4 Alternatives to the Mutable Router Alert Option . . . 36
8.2 Change of Source Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
8.2.1 Justifications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
8.2.2 Alternatives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
9. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
9.1 Addition of Access Router Option . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
9.2 Router Global Address Option . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
9.3 Accepting Tunnel with a Source Address not Directly
Bound to the Home Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
9.4 Use of Extended Routing Header Type 2 . . . . . . . . . . 41
9.5 Mutable Router Alert Option . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
9.6 IPSec Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
9.6.1 Processing of Extended Routing Header Type 2 . . . . . 43
9.6.2 Processing of Home Address Destination Option . . . . 43
9.6.3 Processing of Mutable Router Alert Option . . . . . . 43
10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
A. Acknowledgement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . 47
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1. Introduction
This memo describes a proposed solution for provisioning route
optimization in Network Mobility (NEMO). This solution is built on
top of Mobile IPv6 (MIPv6) [1] and NEMO Basic Support [2][3]. The
general problem of route optimization in NEMO is analyzed and
summarized in [4].
The proposed solution described in this memo aims to solve the
following route optimizations problems:
o Nested Tunnel Optimization
This optimization problem is to eliminate the nesting of tunnels
for a nested mobile network. The proposed solution requires
changes to the mobile router (MR) and home agent (HA)
implementation so that no matter how many level of nesting a
mobile network has, there is only one tunnel between the innermost
MR and its HA.
o Nested Tunnel Optimization for MIPv6
This optimization problem is to eliminate the nesting of tunnels
for a MIPv6 host in a mobile network. The proposed solution
requires changes to the MR, MIPv6 host, and HA (for both the MR
and MIPv6 host) implementation so that for a visiting mobile host
in a mobile network, the only tunnel necessary is the one between
the MIPv6 host and its HA, without additional encapsulation at the
MR.
o MIPv6 over NEMO Optimization
This optimization problem is to allow the MIPv6 route optimization
to work between a MIPv6 host in a mobile network (i.e. visiting
mobile host) and its correspondent node (CN). The proposed
solution requires changes to the MR, MIPv6 host, and CN
implementation so that a visiting mobile host in a mobile network
can perform route optimization with a CN, without any tunneling
back to the home agents of either the MIPv6 host or MR.
Various different proposals have been submitted to the NEMO Working
Group to solve different aspects of the route optimization problem of
network mobility. Readers are encouraged to look at
for a complete list of Internet
Drafts that have been published.
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1.1 Terms Used
It is assumed that readers are familiar with the NEMO terminology
described in [5] and those defined in [4]. In addition, [4] also
presents a detailed description of the problem of route optimization
in NEMO.
Apart from the terms described in [5] and [4], we further define the
following terminology:
Access Router (AR)
Any router that is the point of attachment to the Internet of one
or more visiting mobile node (VMN). We use the phrase "access
router of node X" to loosely refer to the router a node X attaches
to. An access router can be a MR.
ARO-Solution, ARO-enabled
To aid our illustration, we refer to the solution proposed in this
memo as the "ARO-Solution". Any network nodes that implements the
"ARO-Solution" is referred to as a "ARO-enabled" node.
1.2 Organization
In this memo, we first begin in Section 2 by giving a general
overview of the proposed ARO Solution in operation. This is followed
by a detailed description of the modifications to existing protocols
in Section 3. Following which, the operation of each entity: mobile
router, home agent, mobile network node, and correspondent node that
support the ARO Solution are detailed respectively from Section 4
through Section 7. In Section 8, we list some of the design
considerations when formulating the ARO Solution. Finally, security
considerations in discussed in Section 9.
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1.3 Change Log
o Changes from version -00 to -01
* Extended solution to be able to optimized over local fixed
router with inclusion of NEMO-BU RAO
* Inclusion of NEMO-BU RAO and a new ICMPv6 message
* Extended solution for optimization between MR and CN
* Extended solution for optimization between VMN and CN/HA
* Included operations of CN and VMN
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2. Overview of Operation
This section gives an overview of the operation of the proposed
solution. We use the scenario illustrated in Figure 1 below as an
example to describe the operation of the ARO-solution.
HA1
|
+---------|---------+
| |
LFN1---MR1---MR2---- Internet ----CN1
| |
+---------|---------+
|
HA2
Figure 1: Example Scenario
In Figure 1, LFN1 is a local fixed node attached to the ingress
interface of the visiting mobile router (VMR) MR1. MR1 is itself
attached to the ingress interface of another mobile router, MR2. HA1
is the home agent of MR1, and HA2 is the home agent of MR2. LFN1 is
communicating with a correspondent node CN1.
2.1 Router Advertisement
When MR1 first obtains a Router Advertisement (RA) from MR2, it
checks if MR2 supports the ARO-Solution. This is determined by an
additional option (known as Router Global Address Option, or RGAO)
that advertises the home-address (HoA) of MR2.
2.2 Binding Update from MR1 to HA1
After MR1 obtains a care-of-address (CoA), it sends Binding Update
(BU) to its home agent, HA1. The BU message, beside having the
prefix informations as detailed in [2], also contains an important
extension, known as the "Access Router Option" (ARO). This ARO
specifies the global address of MR2, thus informing HA1 the access
router MR1 is currently attached to. In this case, since MR2 is
itself a mobile router, the global address is the HoA of MR2.
HA1 records this together with the binding update in the
corresponding binding cache entry (BCE). When returning the Binding
Acknowledgment (BA), HA1 can then made use of the extended Type 2
Routing Header (RH2) to forward the BA message to MR1 via the HoA of
MR2. Here, the RH2 as defined by Mobile IPv6 specification [1] is
extended so that it can store more than one address. In addition,
HA1 should insert the same ARO in BA message to indicate that the BU
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with ARO is accepted.
Since the BA message is addressed to the HoA of MR2, the BA message
will be intercepted by HA2. Here, we assume that the BCE of HA2
contains a binding of the current CoA and HoA of MR2. Thus, HA2 will
tunnel the packet to the CoA of MR2. When MR2 receives and
decapsulates the BA message, it notices that there is an extended
RH2. It proceeds to swap the destination address with the
appropriate entry in the RH2 (which should be the CoA of MR1), and
forward it to MR1. MR1 receives the packet, verifies that it is the
final destination of the packet, and consumes the BA message.
2.3 Binding Update from MR2 to HA1
From the processing of the extended RH2 as described previously, MR2
can deduce the following two facts:
1. the sender (i.e. HA1) does not have a BCE of MR2's current CoA,
since the received packet is encapsulated in a tunnel from HA2,
and
2. HA1 is ARO-enabled, since an extended RH2 is used.
Having established these, MR2 may then send a BU to HA1. In this
case, HA1 is treated as a correspondent node from the perspective of
MR2. Thus, the Return Routability (RR) procedure specified in [1]
must be carried out before sending the BU message. Note also that
since HA1 is treated as a correspondent node, MR2 should not insert
any prefix information (i.e. Mobile Network Prefix Option [2]) in
the BU message. Once the binding update is successful, MR2 should
add the host address of HA1 to a locally maintained Binding Update
List. This list contains a list of hosts that have an active binding
cache entry of MR2's current CoA.
Note that if the access router (fixed or mobile) of MR2 is ARO-
enabled, MR2 should add an ARO in the BU it sent to HA1 to inform HA1
the global address of the access router MR2 is currently attached to.
To simply our description, we assume that this is not the case.
2.4 Forwarding Packets from HA1 to MR1
After receiving the BU message from MR2, the bi-directional tunnel
between HA1 and MR1 need not go through the tunnel between HA2 and
MR2. Instead, tunnel packets from HA1 to MR1 can be sent directly to
the CoA of MR2 with an attached extended RH2.
As an illustration, suppose CN1 now sends a packet to LFN1. The
packet will be intercepted by HA1. HA1 checks its routing table and
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notices that the packet should be forwarded to MR1. However, a check
of its binding cache reveals that MR1 is away. Hence, HA1 needs to
tunnel the packet to the current CoA of MR1. Furthermore, HA1 knows
that MR1 is currently attached to MR2, and HA1 has a BCE of MR2.
Thus, the tunnel should be configured, with an extended RH2, such
that it reaches CoA of MR1 via CoA MR2. In this case, the
destination address of the outer packet is set to the CoA of MR2, and
the entries in the RH2 are the CoA and HoA of MR1, in that order.
When MR2 receives such a packet, it updates the RH2 (i.e. swap the
destination address with the next entry in the RH2), and forward the
packet to the new destination (i.e. CoA of MR1). MR1 upon receiving
the packet will verify that it is the final destination of the outer
packet, and decapsulates the packet. The inner packet is addressed
to LFN1, a valid address in the subnet of MR1. Hence, MR1 forwards
the packet to its appropriate ingress interface.
2.5 Forwarding Packets from MR1 to HA1
When LFN1 sends a packet to CN1, MR1 will encapsulate the packet to
be sent through the reverse tunnel with its home agent HA1. The
outer packet is appended with a mutable Router Alert Option (RAO)
[6], in addition to the Home Address destination Option (HAO). This
RAO requests upstream routers that are ARO-enabled to forward packet
directly to the destination. When MR2 receives this packet and
noticed the RAO, it checks if it has a binding update with the
specified destination (from its Binding Update List). If so, it
changes the source address to its CoA and sends the packet to the
destination. Else, the packet is tunneled to HA2, i.e. normal
reverse tunneling between MR2 and HA2. For the latter case, MR2
might want to send a BU message to the destination (i.e. HA1) so
that subsequent packets can be forwarded directly to the destination
(without going through an additional level of encapsulation).
When HA1 receives an encapsulated packet, it verifies that the outer
packet originated from authentic source. This is done by checking
that the originator (that is specified by the HAO) has a BCE that
indicates the mobile router identified by the source address is a
valid access router of the originator. HA1 then overwrites the
source address with the HoA specified in HAO and processes it as per
MIPv6 specifications [1].
Section 4 describes in greater detail the operation of an ARO-enabled
mobile router, and Section 5 describes the operation of an
ARO-enabled home agent.
2.6 Scenario with a Local Fixed Router
The ARO-Solution is designed such that it will work even across a non
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ARO-enabled router, such as in the case where there is a local fixed
router in between two ARO-enabled MR. Figure 2 show the scenario
with a non ARO-enabled router LFR1 in between MR1 and MR2. Again,
HA1 and HA2 are the home-agents of MR1 and MR2 respectively. LFR1
simply route packets between its ingress and egress interfaces, and
does not do any reverse tunneling.
HA1
|
+---------|---------+
| |
LFN1---MR1---LFR1---MR2---- Internet ----CN1
| |
+---------|---------+
|
HA2
Figure 2: Example Scenario with a LFR
The problem here is that although MR2 advertises its HoA in the RA
messages it broadcast, LFR1 being non ARO-enabled will ignore such
information. Also, MR1 will not see any RGAO in the RA messages
broadcasted by LFR1. Thus MR1 will not add in any RAO in the tunnel
packet to HA1, and hence MR2 will not attempt to send BU to HA1.
This will result in all packets sent between LFN1 and CN1 to go
through two levels of encapsulation.
To overcome this problem, when an ARO-enabled mobile router (eg MR1)
does not detect its access router to be ARO-enabled, it should try to
determine if there is any ARO-enabled router in its upstream. This
is done by adding a new RAO in the initial BU message it sent to its
HA. Any upstream ARO-enabled router (eg MR2) will detect this RAO,
and respond to MR1 with an ICMP message conveying its global address.
This way, MR1 can immediately send a new BU with the global address
of the MR2 in the ARO. This imply that for the purpose of route
optimization, MR1 treats MR2 as its access router.
2.7 Route Optimization with Mobile Network Hosts
The same mechanism can be extended to be used between a MIPv6 mobile
host and its home agent or correspondent node (CN). Here, the MIPv6
host needs to extract the RGAO from the RA messages it receives from
its access router, and insert the ARO in the BU messages it sent to
its HA or CN. After a successful binding, data packets sent from the
mobile host can be prepend with a RAO to request upstream routers to
attempt to route packets directly to the destination. The RAO can be
inserted when tunneling a packet back to its HA, or inserted when the
packet is sent directly to the CN using MIPv6 route optimization
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mechanism. In this way, a visiting mobile host (VMH) can perform
route optimization over NEMO.
When attempting to use ARO-Solution for full route optimization with
a CN, the mobile host must first determine if the CN is ARO-enabled.
One possible way of such capability detection is to send a BU with
the ARO, and check if the BA returned contains the same ARO. An
ARO-enabled CN would return a BA with the same ARO found in a BU
message.
Section 6 describes in greater detail the operation of an ARO-enabled
mobile node, and Section 7 describes the operation of an ARO-enabled
correspondent node.
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3. Changes to Existing Protocols
3.1 Modifications to NEMO Basic Support / Mobile IPv6
3.1.1 Addition of Access Router Option
The Access Router Option (ARO) is a new option for Mobility Header
defined in Mobile IPv6 and NEMO Basic Support. Its format is shown
below.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type = TBA | Length = 16 |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
+ +
| |
+ Access Router Address +
| |
+ +
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 3: Access Router Option
Type
8-bit identifier of the Mobility Header option type. The value
that identifies an Access Router Option is yet to be assigned.
Length
8-bit unsigned integer that specifies the length of the mobility
option in octets, excluding Type and Length fields. Always 16 for
the Access Router Option.
Access Router Address
Global address of the access router that the sender is currently
attached to.
The Access Router Option is only valid in a BU and BA message. The
purpose of this option is to inform the recipient that the sender is
currently attached to the specified access router. Using this
information, recipient can route packets to the sender via the access
router by making use of extended Type 2 Routing Header. Section 9.1
addresses some security considerations on the use of the Access
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Router Option.
3.1.2 Extending Type 2 Router Header
The Type 2 Routing Header (RH2) is now extended such that it can
contain more than one entry. This extension makes it more similar to
the type 0 routing header. The format of the modified Type 2 Routing
Header is shown below.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Next Header | Hdr Ext Len | Routing Type=2| Segments Left |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Reserved |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
+ +
| |
+ Address [1] +
| |
+ +
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
. .
. . . . .
. .
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
+ +
| |
+ Address [n] +
| |
+ +
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 4: Extended Type 2 Routing Header
Next Header
8-bit selector. Identifies the type of header immediately
following the Routing Header. Uses the same value as the IPv6
Next Header field [7].
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Hdr Ext Len
8-bit unsigned integer. Length of the routing header in 8- octet
units, not including the first 8 octets. This value is always
equal to twice the number of addresses in the Address vector.
Routing Type
8-bit unsigned integer that contains the value 2.
Segments Left
8-bit unsigned integer. Number of route segments remaining; i.e.
number of explicitly listed intermediate nodes still to be visited
before reaching its final destination.
Address[1..n]
Vector of 128-bit addresses, numbered 1 to n.
This routing header is used by the sender to direct the packet to the
mobile node via a sequence of routers. The addresses of the sequence
of routers are placed in the order of visit to the Address[1..n]
vector. The last address, Address[n], must be the HoA of the
intended recipient. Note also that Hdr Ext Len field must always
contain an even number.
Each MR that receives a packet with the Type 2 Routing Header and the
destination field equals to its address must checked if Segments Left
field is equal to 1. If yes, the last address in the Address[]
vector must be its HoA. Else the packet is discarded. If
Segments-Left is non-zero, it decrements the Segment-Left field, and
swaps the destination field with the next address in the Address[]
vector. To work out which address to swap, the MR can divide the Hdr
Ext Len field by 2 (which gives the number of entries in Address[]
vector), and subtract Segment Left from it.
The extended Type 2 Routing Header is a mutable but predictable IPv6
header. Thus IP Security (IPSec) [8] protocols such as
Authentication Header (AH) [9] and Encapsulating Security Payload
(ESP) [10] can be used with the routing header. Security
considerations on the extension of Type 2 Routing Header are
presented in Section 9.4.
3.1.3 Modification to Conceptual Data Structures
In Mobile IPv6 [1], the Binding Cache data structure is defined to
contain entries of HoA to CoA bindings. NEMO Basic Support [2]
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suggested the extension of each BCE to contain information on
prefixes injected by mobile routers. This ARO-Solution further
extends each BCE to contain an additional field known as the Access
Router Address. This field is used to store the global address of
the access router specified in the Access Router Option in a Binding
Update message.
When updating the BCE, the Access Router Address field is overwritten
with the address specified in the Access Router Option. If the
Access Router Option is absent, the Access Router Address field
should be marked to be invalid.
3.2 Modifications to IPv6 Neighbor Discovery
3.2.1 Addition of New Option in Router Advertisement
A new option, Router Global Address Option (RGAO) is defined here.
This new option can only appear in a Router Advertisement message,
its format is defined below.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length | Reserved |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Reserved |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
+ +
| |
+ Router Global Address +
| |
+ +
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 5: Router Global Address Option
Type
8-bit identifier to identify the type of the option. The value
used to identify the Router Global Address Option is yet to be
assigned.
Length
8-bit unsigned integer that gives the length of the option in
8-octet units. Always equals to 3 for the Router Global Address
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Option.
Router Global Address
128-bit address. Contains the global address of the egress
interface of the sender. Should the sender be a mobile router,
this global address is the home-address of the sender.
This option allows the sender to advertise its egress interface
global address to nodes attached to its ingress interface(s). This
allows mobile nodes to include an Access Router Option when sending
BU. Inclusion of this option in a RA message would imply the sender
is ARO-enabled.
Security considerations for the Router Global Address Option are
listed in Section 9.2. According to Section 4.2 of IPv6 Neighbor
Discovery [11], receivers that do not understand this new option MUST
silently ignore the option and continue processing the Router
Advertisement message.
3.3 Modifications to ICMPv6
3.3.1 New Router Global Address ICMP Message
A new ICMP message to convey the global address of a mobile router is
needed in the ARO-Solution. This message, called the Router Global
Address Message, has a format as defined below.
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0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Code | CheckSum |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Reserved |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
+ +
| |
+ Router Global Address +
| |
+ +
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 6: Router Global Address ICMP Message
Type
8-bit identifier to identify the type of the ICMP Message. The
value used to identify the Router Global Address Message is yet to
be assigned.
Code
8-bit unsigned integer that gives the finer granularity on message
type differentiation. Set to 0 for the Router Global Address
Message.
CheckSum
8-bit ICMP Checksum (see [12]
Router Global Address
128-bit address. Contains the global address of the egress
interface of the sender. Should the sender be a mobile router,
this global address is the home-address of the sender.
This message is sent when a ARO-enabled router intercepts a packet
from its ingress interface containing a NEMO-BU RAO. This occurs
when a nested MR does not know its access router's global address,
and is attempting to learn its access router's global address. The
ARO-enabled router intercepting such a packet would send the Router
Global Address ICMP message to the source, revealing its global
address (or home-address if the ARO-enabled router is also a mobile
router).
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3.4 Extending the Router Alert Option
The router alert option [6] has the following format:
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|0 0 0|0 0 1 0 1|0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0| Value (2 octets) |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 7: Router Alert Option
The first three bits of the first byte are zero and the value 5 in
the remaining five bits is the Hop-by-Hop Option Type number. By
zeroing all three, this specification requires that nodes not
recognizing this option type should skip over this option and
continue processing the header, and that the option must not change
en route.
In this memo, we require the value field to be mutable en-route.
Specifically, the router that is not attached to a ARO- enabled
access router will change the value code. Thus, this memo propose a
mutable Router Alert Option, of the following format:
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|0 0 1|0 0 1 0 1|0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0| Value (2 octets) |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 8: Mutable Router Alert Option
The first two bits of the first byte are zero, the third bit is 1 and
the value 5 in the remaining five bits. Thus the Hop-by-Hop Option
Type number is 0x25 (hexadecimal). By zeroing the first two bits,
this memo requires that nodes not recognizing this option type should
skip over this option and continue processing the header.
The Value code in the mutable Router Alert Option is extended to
contain three extra values to be assigned. For purpose of
description, we call these values the NEMO-Forward, NEMO-No-Forward,
and NEMO-BU. Hereafter, mutable Router Alert Option with Value code
equal to NEMO- Forward will be known as a NEMO-Forward Router Alert
Option, or simply, NEMO-Fwd RAO; mutable Router Alert Option with
Value code equal to NEMO-No-Forward will be known as a
NEMO-No-Forward Router Alert Option, or simply, NEMO-NoFwd RAO; and
mutable Router Alert Option with Value code equal to NEMO-BU will be
known as a NEMO-BU Router Alert Option, or simply, NEMO-BU RAO.
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Intermediate routers that support the ARO-Solution should recognize
the NEMO-Fwd RAO and attempt to forward the packet directly to the
destination without using a reverse tunnel. If necessary, the router
can change the source address of the packet to the current CoA of the
router in order to pass through ingress filters of subsequent
routers/gateways.
Intermediate routers that support the ARO-Solution should recognize
the NEMO-NoFwd RAO, and behave as if the RAO is not present.
Specifically, the router MUST NOT change the source address of the
packet.
Intermediate routers that support the ARO-Solution should recognize
the NEMO-BU RAO, and realize that the sender (indicated by the source
address), is attempting to discover the global address of its access
router. The ARO-enabled intermediate router should then change the
NEMO-BU RAO to a NEMO-NoFwd RAO before forwarding the packet. In
addition, it should send a Router Global Address ICMP message (see
Section 3.3.1) to the source of the packet containing the NEMO-BU
RAO. This allows the source to learn the HoA of the MR.
Section 8.1 discusses some of the design considerations that lead to
the use of a mutable Router Alert Option.
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4. Operation of ARO-Enabled Mobile Routers
4.1 Operation When Mobile Router is At Home
This section describes the operation of a MR when it is attached to
its home link.
4.1.1 Sending Router Advertisement
When the MR sends RA message, it should advertise its HoA by adding a
RGAO in the RA message. This also indicates to the recipients that
the MR is ARO-enabled.
4.1.2 Processing Outbound Packets
When the MR intercepts an outbound packet from its ingress interface,
it first checks if the packet contains a NEMO-Fwd RAO or a NEMO-BU
RAO. Packets that do not contain a NEMO-Fwd RAO, or packets that
contain a NEMO-NoFwd RAO are simply forwarded to its egress
interface. For packet that contains a NEMO-Fwd RAO, since the MR is
at home, it changes the NEMO-Fwd RAO to a NEMO-NoFwd RAO and forwards
the packet to its egress interface.
If the packet contains a NEMO-BU RAO, it implies that the originator
of that packet is an ARO-enabled node trying to learn if there is an
ARO-enabled access router in its upstream. The MR should send to
this originator a Router Global Address ICMP message (see Section
3.3.1). In addition, the MR should change the NEMO-BU RAO to a
NEMO-NoFwd RAO, and forward the packet to its egress interface.
4.1.3 Processing Inbound Packets
When the MR is at home, it functions like a normal router. Thus it
will consume any packet that is addressed to its HoA, forward any
packet with a destination address that is a valid address in one of
its ingress interface (e.g. the destination address must contain the
same network prefix as one of the ingress interface), and discard any
packet with an invalid destination address.
When the packet is addressed to the MR's HoA, the packet may contain
an extended RH2. The Segments Left field of RH2 is checked. If
Segments Left field is 0, the packet is consumed. If Segments Left
field is non-zero, it is checked to be smaller or equal to the number
of addresses in the Type 2 Routing Header (which can be calculated by
dividing the Ext Hdr Len field by two). If Segments Left field is
bigger, the packet is discarded, and an ICMP error may be returned to
the sender. Else, the Segments Left field is decremented by one and
the destination address is swapped with the next entry in the
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Address[] vector of the RH2.
The new destination address is then checked if it is a valid address
in one of the ingress interfaces of the MR. If yes, the packet is
forwarded to the new destination. Else, the packet is silently
discarded.
4.2 Operation When Mobile Router is Away
This section describes the operation of a MR when it is away from its
home link.
4.2.1 Sending Router Advertisement
The MR would continue to send RA messages to its ingress interface(s)
when it is away. It should behave as specified in Section 4.1.1.
There is no difference in the RA message whether the MR is at home or
away.
4.2.2 Receiving Router Advertisement
The MR should solicit RA from its access router whenever it changes
its point of attachment to the Internet. When the MR receives the
RA, it should check if the access router has included the RGAO in the
RA message. If an RGAO is present, the access router is ARO-enabled.
If no RGAO is present, the access router is not ARO-enabled.
4.2.3 Sending Binding Updates
When the MR sends BU to other hosts, either its own HA or other
correspondent nodes, it should add an ARO to the BU messages if its
access router is ARO-enabled. The ARO should contain the global
address of the access router it learned from the RGAO in the RA
message. Otherwise, if its access router is not ARO-enabled, the MR
will not include the ARO in the BU messages.
When sending BU with the ARO, especially to nodes that the MR does
not know to be ARO-enabled, the MR should request for a BA so that it
can determine if the recipient supports the ARO-Solution by checking
if the ARO is present in the BA message. If the ARO is present, the
node is ARO-enabled.
If the access router is not ARO-enabled, a MR may attempt to discover
if there are any ARO-enabled routers upstream by prepending a NEMO-BU
RAO to the BU message it sends out. If there exist an ARO-enabled
router upstream, the ARO-enabled router will send an ICMP message
containing the global address (eg HoA) of the ARO-enabled router.
For this case, the MR can send another BU message with an ARO
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containing this global address.
If no response is received after a short timeout period, the MR
should concede that there is no ARO-enabled router upstream.
4.2.4 Processing Outbound Packets
When the MR received a packet from its ingress interface for outbound
forwarding, the behavior of the MR will be different depending on
whether the outbound packet contains a RAO or not.
1. Packet does not have any RAO
When the MR intercepts a packet from one of its ingress
interfaces, it first checks if there is a NEMO-Fwd RAO or NEMO-BU
RAO attached to the packet. When the NEMO-Fwd RAO is absent (or
a NEMO- NoFwd RAO is present), the MR has to route this packet
through its own HA. The packet is encapsulated in an outer
packet addressed to the HA of the mobile router. If the MR's
access router is not ARO-enabled, the outer packet is sent to the
MR's home agent. The outer packet has the normal mobility
characteristics, i.e. the source field contains the CoA of the
MR and the destination field contains the address of the HA of
the MR.
If the MR's access router is ARO-enabled, reverse tunneling is
still necessary. However, in this case, the mobile router will
add a NEMO-Fwd RAO to the outer packet. The outer packet is then
marked with source address set to the CoA of the MR, destination
address set to the address of the MR's HA. and attached with a
Home Address destination Option containing the HoA of the MR.
2. Packet has a NEMO-NoFwd RAO
Processing of an outbound packet with a NEMO-NoFwd RAO is
identical to that when the packet contains no RAO.
3. Packet has a NEMO-Fwd RAO
On the other hand, when the MR received a packet with a NEMO-Fwd
RAO from one of its ingress interfaces, the MR will then attempt
to forward the packet directly to the destination. To do so, the
MR has to check if it has a binding update with the specified
destination (by checking its Binding Update List). If it does
not have an active binding update with the specified destination,
the MR will have to tunnel the received packet to its HA using
reverse tunneling. In this case, the NEMO-Fwd RAO is changed to
a NEMO-NoFwd RAO, and the packet is processed as though it does
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not contain a NEMO-Fwd RAO (as described previously).
The presence of a NEMO-Fwd RAO should suggest to the MR that it
could perform a Return Routability Procedure and BU with the
specified destination, so that subsequent packets from the same
source to the same destination need not go through the bi-
directional tunnel.
If the MR does have an active binding update with the specified
destination, the source address of the packet is changed to the
CoA of the MR. In addition, if the access router of the MR is
not ARO-enabled, the NEMO-Fwd RAO is changed to a NEMO-NoFwd RAO.
The packet is then forwarded through the egress interface of the
MR.
4. Packet has a NEMO-BU RAO
When the MR intercepts a packet from one of its ingress
interfaces with a NEMO-BU RAO, it implies that the originator of
that packet is an ARO-enabled node trying to learn if there is an
ARO-enabled access router in its upstream. The MR should send to
this originator a Router Global Address ICMP message (see Section
3.3.1). In addition, the MR should change the NEMO-BU RAO to a
NEMO-NoFwd RAO, and process the packet as though it does not
contain a NEMO-BU RAO (as described previously).
4.2.5 Processing Inbound Packets
When the MR received a packet from its egress interface, the MR
checks if the packet is addressed to itself. Packets not addressed
to its CoA or HoA are discarded. When the packet is addressed to its
CoA, the MR checks for the presence of type 2 routing header (RH2).
Packets without the RH2 are processed as per specified in [2]. If
the packet contains a RH2 and is addressed to its CoA, the packet
must be sent from a host that has a BCE of the MR. If security
measures warrant it, the MR may want to verify the sender is indeed a
node in the MR's Binding Update List, and discard the packet if it
isn't.
The Segments Left field of RH2 is then checked. If Segments Left
field is 0, the packet is discarded. If Segments Left field is non-
zero, it is checked to be smaller or equal to the number of addresses
in the RH2 (which can be calculated by dividing the Ext Hdr Len field
by two). If Segments Left field is bigger, the packet is discarded,
and an ICMP error may be returned to the sender. Else, the Segments
Left field is decremented by one and the destination address is
swapped with the next entry in the Address[] vector of the RH2.
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If the new destination address is the HoA of the MR, the Segments
Left field is checked if it is 0 (after decrementing). If so, the
packet is consumed by the MR. Otherwise, the packet is silently
discarded.
Alternatively, the new destination address may be an address in one
of the MR's ingress interfaces. If yes, the packet is forwarded to
the new destination. Else, if the new destination field of the
packet is neither the HoA nor a valid address in one of the MR's
ingress interfaces, the packet is silently discarded.
When a packet is consumed by the MR, the payload may be an
encapsulated packet. In this case, sender of the outer packet must
be the HA of the MR, or a node in MR's Binding Update List.
Processing of the inner packet is the same as though the mobile
router is at home.
4.3 IPSec Processing
It is recommended that the MR uses IPSec protocols such as AH [9] or
ESP [10] to secure the reverse tunnel with its HA [13]. This section
highlights changes to the IPSec processing for inbound and outbound
packets.
4.3.1 IPSec Processing on Inbound Packets
Inbound packets may contain a RH2 with an AH/ESP. The RH2 should be
processed before AH. If the MR is the final destination, the packet
is passed to the IPSec module for AH/ESP processing. Since the HA or
CN will generate the AH/ESP in a such a way that it is consistent
with the state of the packet headers when the receiver received the
packet (see Section 5.4.2), no additional processing needs to be done
before the AH/ESP processing.
4.3.2 IPSec Processing on Outbound Packets
For outbound packets, the new options added to the packets by the
ARO-Solution are the NEMO-Fwd, NEMO-BU and NEMO-NoFwd Router Alert
Options. For simplicity, it is best that all IPSec implementations
ignore these options and treat their values as all zero when
processing.
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5. Operation of ARO-Enabled Home Agents
5.1 Receiving Binding Updates
When a HA receives a BU message, it needs to check for the necessary
security measures as specified in Mobile IPv6 specifications [1] or
NEMO Basic Support [2]. The only change this ARO Solution requires
is for the HA to add a field to its Binding Cache: access router's
address. Every valid BU is checked for the Access Router Option
field. If one is absent, the corresponding BCE will have the access
router field invalidated. If one is present, the corresponding BCE
will have the access router field updated.
In addition, when returning a BA for a BU that contains an Access
Router Option, the ARO-Solution requires that the HA return a the BA
with the same Access Router Option if the binding is successful.
Note also that the HA MUST accept BU with Access Router Option
regardless of whether the Home Registration bit is set.
5.2 Receiving Tunneled Packets from Away Nodes
When the HA received a packet that contains an encapsulated packet,
it may choose to perform certain security checks. The obvious check
is to ensure that the source address is either a valid CoA of the HoA
in its binding cache, or the source address is a valid CoA or HoA of
an access router that is in the upstream of the mobile node with the
specified HoA in the Home Address Destination option. Section 9.3
discusses the security considerations on accepting tunnels with a
source address that is not directly bound to the HoA specified in the
Home Address destination option.
To establish this, the HA can use the pseudo algorithm depicted in
Figure 9. The algorithm returns TRUE if the source address in a
valid address, and FALSE otherwise. When the algorithm returns TRUE,
the source address is a valid address, and the packet is decapsulated
and processed as normal. Should the algorithm evaluates to FALSE,
the packet is discarded.
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set start-address = HoA in HAO
while (TRUE) do
{
find an entry in Binding Cache with HoA field == start-address
if (no BCE is found)
{
return (FALSE)
}
if (CoA field in the BCE
== source-address of outer packet)
{
return (TRUE)
}
if (the BCE does not contain a valid access
router address)
{
return (FALSE)
}
if (access router address field in the BCE
== source-address of outer packet)
{
return (TRUE)
}
set start-address = access router address field in the BCE
}
Figure 9: Algorithm to check source address is valid
5.3 Tunneling Packets to Away Nodes
When the HA intercepted a packet addressed to a node in its home
domain, it checks the next hop to forward the packet from its routing
table. This sub-section describes the operation of the HA when the
next hop is away, i.e. the next hop is a mobile node, and the mobile
node is away from home.
In this case, the HA will forward the packet to the mobile node at
the CoA of the mobile node. This is done by encapsulating the
intercepted packet into a new packet. According to standard MIPv6
specification [1], the packet will have the source address set to the
address of the HA, destination set to the CoA of the mobile router,
and a RH2 with only one address entry equals to the HoA of the mobile
node.
This ARO-Solution extends the RH2 to include addresses of access
routers, and the pseudo algorithm depicted in Figure 10 can be used
to construct such a routing header. In Figure 10, src-address and
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dst-address are the abbreviations for the source address and
destination address fields of the outer packet respectively.
initialize an empty stack
set src-address = address of home agent
set dst-address = HoA of mobile node
set Finished = FALSE
while (not Finished)
{
find BCE with HoA field = dst-address
if (no BCE is found)
{
Finished = TRUE
}
else
{
if (dst-address == HoA of mobile node)
{
push dst-address to stack
}
set dst-address = CoA field of the found BCE
if (the found BCE contains a valid access router address)
{
push dst-address to stack
set dst-address = access router address field of BCE found
}
else
{
Finished = TRUE
}
}
}
if (stack is not empty)
{
prepare a type 2 routing header
set Hdr Ext Len field of RH2 = (size of stack) x 2
set Segments Left field of RH2 = size of stack
for n=1 to (Segments Left field of RH2)
{
pop top of stack to Address[n] of RH2
}
}
Figure 10: Algorithm to construct extended RH2
The outer packet is then sent to the destination. If secure tunnel
is used, the IPSec protocol used must be able to recognize that the
RH2 is a mutable but predictable header, such that the two end-points
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use the same routing header and IPv6 destination field for IPSec
processing. Particularly, the sender should calculate the IPSec
parameters using values in the IPv6 headers that the receiver will
receive.
5.4 IPSec Processing
It is recommended that the HA uses IPSec protocols such as AH [9] or
ESP [10] to protect the tunnel with a mobile node [13]. This section
highlights changes to the IPSec processing for inbound and outbound
packets.
5.4.1 IPSec Processing on Inbound Packets
Packets that are inbound may have their source address modified en-
route by access routers. Thus, all home-agents SHOULD use the
algorithm shown in Figure 9 to establish the authenticity of the
source address. Once the source address is verified, the source
address field will be replaced by the HoA specified in the Home
Address Destination option, and the Home Address field of the Home
Address Destination option MUST be replaced with the CoA of the
sender. In MIPv6, this CoA can be obtained from the source address
field in the packet. However, the ARO-Solution allows intermediate
mobile routers to modify the source address field. Thus, the home
agent MUST obtain the CoA from its BCE.
The above processing MUST be carried out before AH processing.
5.4.2 IPSec Processing on Outbound Packets
Outbound packets may contain an extended RH2. The extended RH2 is a
mutable but predictable header. According to the usual norm of
generating AH authentication data, the HA must order the contents of
the RH2 as it will appear at the final destination when generating
the AH authentication data.
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6. Operation of ARO-Enabled Mobile Network Nodes
The operation of an ARO-enabled MNN is very similar to that of a MR.
When the MNN is at home, there is no additional operation
requirements imposed by the ARO Solution (i.e. the ARO-enabled MNN
operation is similar to a normal MNN when it is at home). This
section described the operation of MNN when it is away (i.e. it is a
VMN).
6.1 Nested Tunnel Optimization with Home Agent
In this case, the MNN is VMN using MIPv6 bi-direction tunneling with
its HA. If it is ARO-enabled, and its HA is also ARO-enabled, then
the number of nested tunnel can be reduced to one.
The MNN basically follows the same procedure as an ARO-enabled MR.
It needs to detect the RGAO in the RA messages broadcasted by its
access router to determine if its access router is ARO-enabled. When
sending BU message to its HA, the MNN will insert an ARO to the BU
message containing the home-address of its access router.
After the binding is successful, the MNN can then attached a NEMO-Fwd
RAO in the tunnel packets sent to its HA. Note that when doing so,
the MNN needs to attach a Home Address Destination Option in the
tunnel packet.
6.2 Receiving Router Advertisement
The MNN should solicit RA from its access router whenever it changes
its point of attachment to the Internet. When the MNN receives the
RA, it should check if the access router has included the RGAO in the
RA message. If an RGAO is present, the access router is ARO-enabled.
If no RGAO is present, the access router is not ARO-enabled.
6.3 Sending Binding Updates
When the MNN sends BU to other hosts, either its own HA or other
correspondent nodes, it should add an ARO to the BU messages if its
access router is ARO-enabled. The ARO should contain the global
address of the access router it learned from the RGAO in the RA
message. Otherwise, if its access router is not ARO-enabled, the MNN
will not include the ARO in the BU messages.
When sending BU with the ARO, especially to nodes that the MNN does
not know to be ARO-enabled, the MNN should request for a BA so that
it can determine if the recipient supports the ARO-Solution by
checking if the ARO is present in the BA message. If the ARO is
present, the node is ARO-enabled.
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If the access router is not ARO-enabled, a MNN may attempt to
discover if there are any ARO-enabled routers upstream by prepending
a NEMO-BU RAO to the BU message it sends out. If there exist an
ARO-enabled router upstream, the ARO-enabled router will send an ICMP
message containing the global address of the ARO-enabled router. For
this case, the MNN can send another BU message with an ARO containing
this global address.
If no response is received after a short timeout period, the MNN
should concede that there is no ARO-enabled router upstream.
6.4 Sending Data Packets
When the MNN is tunneling data packets to its HA, the MNN can add a
NEMO-Fwd RAO to the tunnel packet (i.e. outer packet) if (1) its HA
is ARO-enabled, and (2) its access router is ARO-enabled. Otherwise,
the MNN should use the normal MIPv6 bi-directional tunneling to
forward the data packet to its HA. When adding the NEMO-Fwd RAO, the
MNN should also include a Home Address Destination Option in the
tunnel packet.
When the MNN knows (by other means) that the CN it is communicating
with is ARO-enabled, the MNN can choose to employ full route
optimization with the CN. This is done by adding a NEMO-Fwd RAO to
the data packet. Note that the MNN should also include a Home
Address Destination Option in the data packet.
6.5 Processing Inbound Packets
When the MNN received a packet from its egress interface, the MNN
checks if the packet is addressed to itself. Packets not addressed
to its CoA or HoA are discarded. When the packet is addressed to its
CoA, the MNN checks for the presence of type 2 routing header (RH2).
Packets without the RH2 are processed as per specified in [2]. If
the packet contains a RH2 and is addressed to its CoA, the packet
must be sent from a host that has a BCE of the MNN. If security
measures warrant it, the MR may want to verify the sender is indeed a
node in the MR's Binding Update List, and discard the packet if it
isn't.
The Segments Left field of RH2 is then checked. If Segments Left
field is 0, the packet is discarded. If Segments Left field is non-
zero, it is checked to be smaller or equal to the number of addresses
in the RH2 (which can be calculated by dividing the Ext Hdr Len field
by two). If Segments Left field is bigger, the packet is discarded,
and an ICMP error may be returned to the sender. Else, the Segments
Left field is decremented by one and the destination address is
swapped with the next entry in the Address[] vector of the RH2.
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Being a host, the MNN must be the final destination of the packet.
Thus, if the new destination address is not the HoA of MNN, or the
Segments Left field is non-zero after decrementing, the packet is
silently discarded. Else if the new destination address is the HoA
of MNN, and the Segments Left field is zero after decrementing the
packet is consumed.
When a packet is consumed by the MNN, the payload may be an
encapsulated packet. In this case, sender of the outer packet must
be the HA of the MNN. Processing of the inner packet is the same as
though the MNN is at home.
6.6 IPSec Processing
6.6.1 IPSec Processing on Inbound Packets
Inbound packets may contain a RH2 with an AH/ESP. The routing header
should be processed before AH. If the MNN is the final destination,
the packet is passed to the IPSec module for AH/ESP processing.
Since the HA or CN will generate the AH/ESP in a such a way that it
is consistent with the state of the packet headers when the receiver
received the packet (see Section 5.4.2), no additional processing
needs to be done before the AH/ESP processing.
6.6.2 IPSec Processing on Outbound Packets
For outbound packets, the new options added to the packets by the
ARO-Solution are the NEMO-Fwd, NEMO-BU and NEMO-NoFwd Router Alert
Options. For simplicity, it is best that all IPSec implementations
ignore these options and treat their values as all zero when
processing.
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7. Operation of ARO-Enabled Correspondent Node
7.1 Receiving Binding Updates
When a CN receives a BU message, it needs to check for the necessary
security measures as specified in Mobile IPv6 specifications [1] or
NEMO Basic Support [2]. The only change this ARO Solution requires
is for the CN to add a field to its Binding Cache: access router's
address. Every valid BU is checked for the Access Router Option
field. If one is absent, the corresponding BCE will have the access
router field invalidated. If one is present, the corresponding BCE
will have the access router field updated.
In addition, when returning a BA for a BU that contains an Access
Router Option, the ARO-Solution requires that the CN returns a the BA
with the same Access Router Option if the binding is successful.
Note that a BU sent to the CN MUST be preceded with a return
routability procedure. Section 9.1 discusses possibility of
extending the return routability procedure to protect the Access
Router Option.
7.2 Receiving Route Optimized Packets from Mobile Nodes
When the CN received a packet that contains a Home Address
Destination Option, it will have to perform certain security checks
to ensure that the source address is either a valid CoA of the HoA in
its binding cache, or the source address is a valid CoA or HoA of an
access router that is in the upstream of the mobile node with the
specified HoA in the Home Address Destination option. Section 9.3
discusses the security considerations on accepting tunnels with a
source address that is not directly bound to the HoA specified in the
Home Address destination option.
To establish this, the CN can use the pseudo algorithm depicted in
Figure 9 shown in Section 5.2. The algorithm returns TRUE if the
source address in a valid address, and FALSE otherwise. When the
algorithm returns TRUE, the source address is a valid address, and
the source address is replaced with the HoA contained in the Home
Address Destination Option and processed as normal. Should the
algorithm evaluates to FALSE, the packet is silently discarded.
7.3 Sending Route Optimized Packets to Mobile Nodes
When the CN sends a packet, it should check if the destination
address is in its BCE. If the destination is not in the BCE, then
the packet is sent as per normal IPv6 operation. If the destination
is in its BCE, normal MIPv6 will require that the source address be
set to the address of the CN, destination set to the CoA of the MR,
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and a RH2 with only one address entry equals to the HoA of the mobile
node.
This ARO-Solution extends the RH2 to include addresses of access
routers, and the pseudo algorithm depicted in Figure 10 shown in
Section 5.3 can be used to construct such a routing header. In
Figure 10, src-address and dst-address are the abbreviations for the
source address and destination address fields of the outer packet
respectively.
If IPSec protocol is used to protect the packet, the IPSec protocol
used must be able to recognize that the RH2 is a mutable but
predictable header, such that the two end-points use the same routing
header and IPv6 destination field for IPSec processing.
Particularly, the sender should calculate the IPSec parameters using
values in the IPv6 headers that the receiver will receive.
7.4 IPSec Processing
7.4.1 IPSec Processing on Inbound Packets
Packets that are inbound may have their source address modified en-
route by access routers. Thus, all ARO-enabled correspondent nodes
SHOULD use the algorithm depicted in Figure 9 shown in Section 5.2 to
establish the authenticity of the source address. Once the source
address is verified, the source address field will be replaced by the
HoA specified in the Home Address Destination option, and the Home
Address field of the Home Address Destination option MUST be replaced
with the CoA of the sender. In MIPv6, this CoA can be obtained from
the source address field in the packet. However, the ARO-Solution
allows intermediate mobile routers to modify the source address
field. Thus, the CN MUST obtain the CoA from its BCE.
The above processing MUST be carried out before AH processing.
7.4.2 IPSec Processing on Outbound Packets
Outbound packets may contain an extended RH2. The extended RH2 is a
mutable but predictable header. According to the usual norm of
generating AH authentication data, the CN must order the contents of
the RH2 as it will appear at the final destination when generating
the AH authentication data.
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8. Design Considerations
This section describes the rational behind some design decision made
in the formulation of the ARO Solution. Some justifications are
given, and in some cases, alternative approaches are discussed.
8.1 Considerations in the Use of Mutable Router Alert Option
8.1.1 Overview of Router Alert Option
The ARO Solution described in this memo is designed so that it will
work in a nested NEMO where some mobile routers are ARO-enabled and
some are not. Thus, some form of indications on a packet is
necessary to inform upstream mobile routers to attempt to use the ARO
Solution. Since the indication is meant for intermediate routers, a
hop-by-hop option is needed.
The Router Alert Option [6] lends itself readily for use. By
assigning a value in RAO, a ARO-enabled mobile router can request its
access router to attempt to forward the packet directly to the
destination without using reverse tunnel. However, further analysis
reveals that there is a need for a mobile router that is not attached
to a ARO-enabled access router to disable this behavior.
8.1.2 Example where an Immutable RAO is Used
To understand why a MR that is not attached to a ARO- enabled access
router should disable the NEMO-Fwd RAO, consider the following
scenario, where MR1, MR2, and MR4 are ARO-enabled mobile routers,
LFR3 is a non-ARO-enabled local fixed router attached to MR4, and HA1
is the home agent of MR1.
MR1---MR2---LFR3---MR4---[Internet]---HA1
Suppose both MR1 and MR2 have performed binding updates successfully
with HA1, thus the state of the Binding Cache of HA1 will be:
Home-Address Care-of-Address Access Router
------------ --------------- -------------
MR1.HoA MR1.CoA MR2.HoA
MR2.HoA MR2.CoA
When MR1 encapsulates a packet to be tunneled to HA1, MR1 adds a
NEMO-Fwd RAO in the outer packet (since MR2, the access router of
MR1, is ARO-enabled). Thus the packet from MR1 to MR2 will contains
the following contents:
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IPv6 Hdr (src=MR1.CoA, dst=HA1)
Hop-by-Hop Opt
RAO (NEMO-Fwd)
Dest Opt
HAO (MR1.HoA)
Since MR2 has already performed a binding update with HA1, it changes
the source address and forwards the packet to LFR3. LFR3 is a fixed
router, thus it simply forwards the packet to MR4. At MR4, the
packet contents is then:
IPv6 Hdr (src=MR2.CoA, dst=HA1)
Hop-by-Hop Opt
RAO (NEMO-Fwd)
Dest Opt
HAO (MR1.HoA)
When MR4 intercepts this packet, the presence of the NEMO-Fwd RAO
will cause MR4 to start a binding update with HA1, and tunnels the
packet to its home agent. From the home agent of MR4, the packet is
forwarded to HA1.
Suppose now HA1 accepts the binding update with MR4, and its Binding
Cache is thus as follows:
Home-Address Care-of-Address Access Router
------------ --------------- -------------
MR1.HoA MR1.CoA MR2.HoA
MR2.HoA MR2.CoA
MR4.HoA MR4.HoA
Now, when MR1 sends a tunnel packet to HA1 again, the packet will
arrive at MR4 with the following contents:
IPv6 Hdr (src=MR2.CoA, dst=HA1)
Hop-by-Hop Opt
RAO (NEMO-Fwd)
Dest Opt
HAO (MR1.HoA)
This time, MR4 checks that HA1 is on its Binding Update List, thus it
will change the source address of the packet to its CoA and forward
the packet to HA1 through the Internet. When HA1 receives the
packet, the contents will be:
IPv6 Hdr (src=MR4.CoA, dst=HA1)
Hop-by-Hop Opt
RAO (NEMO-Fwd)
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Dest Opt
HAO (MR1.HoA)
Because the Access Router field of the BCE for MR2 is marked invalid,
the algorithm for checking the validity of the source address as
shown in Figure 9 of Section 5.2 will fail. Thus the packet will be
discarded at HA1.
8.1.3 The Need for Mutable RAO
The example in the previous section shows that the presence of a
local fixed router (LFR) that is not ARO-enabled may cause an
unintentional denial-of-service to mobile routers that are attached
to the LFR.
To avoid this problem, MR4 must somehow realize that it should ignore
the NEMO-Fwd RAO in a packet forwarded by MR2. One method is to
check that the source address is a valid source address in the
ingress interface of MR4. However, MR2 might obtain a CoA that
contains a prefix that is valid in the ingress interface of MR4.
Thus checking source address does not completely eliminate the
problem.
If MR2 can somehow invalidate the NEMO-Fwd RAO, the problem can be
eliminated. But the Router Alert Option as defined in [6] is an
immutable hop-by-hop option, so what is needed here is a mutable
router alert option.
8.1.4 Alternatives to the Mutable Router Alert Option
There are other alternatives to the mutable Router Alert Option.
These include using the Flow label in IPv6 header, and defining a new
routing header type. These are briefly described below.
o IPv6 Flow Label
It is possible to use the IPv6 Flow label to achieve the same
effects as the mutable Router Alert Option. A specific, universal
Flow label can be reserved to indicate to NEMO-enabled routers
that they should try to forward the packets directly to their
destination (instead of using a reverse tunnel with home agents).
This approach eliminates the need of defining a new hop-by-hop
header option. However, this means that a specific flow label has
to be reserved, which may be in contention with currently deployed
IPv6 nodes. In addition, this will mean that NEMO-enabled mobile
routers are unable to use Flow label for other purposes.
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o New Routing Header Type
A new routing header type can be defined to store the address of
the final destination. When such a routing header is used, the
originator will place the address of the final destination in the
routing header, and place the home-address of the access router of
the originator in the destination (when the access router is NEMO-
enabled). When a NEMO-enabled mobile router that is not attached
to a NEMO-enabled access router receives a packet with this type
of routing header, it will overwrite the destination address of
the packet with the final destination specified in the routing
header, and decrement the Segments Left field. When a
NEMO-enabled mobile router that is attached to a NEMO-enabled
access router receives a packet with this type of routing header,
it will overwrite the destination address of this packet with the
home-address of its access router and the leave the contents of
the routing header untouched.
There remain issues that are unclear when this new type of routing
header is used with other routing headers. Also, the security
implication of defining a new type of routing header is yet to be
explored.
o Discarding Immutable RAO
Another possibility is to use the normal immutable RAO and instead
allow routers en-route to simply discard the RAO (instead of
changing it to a NEMO-NoFwd RAO). This will work exactly the
same, and is both applicable to NEMO-Fwd and NEMO-BU RAO. It will
in fact reduce processing delay when the RAO is only option in the
hop-by-hop header. Since this will cause the hop-by-hop header to
be removed, and en-route router need not process the hop-by-hop
header and only to find that it contains a NEMO-NoFwd RAO which
requires no processing.
8.2 Change of Source Address
This memo proposed to allow intermediate routers to change the source
address of a packet en-route. It is expected that this will cause
some disturbances, as it is generally not allowed for routers to
change the source address. We hope to justify our design decision in
this section, and discuss some alternatives.
8.2.1 Justifications
The main factor in consideration to changing the source address en-
route is to overcome ingress filtering. In order for a packet to be
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able to pass through an ingress filter, the source address must be
topologically compatible with where the packet is originated. Thus,
to overcome ingress filtering, the source address must somehow be
changed. We view the change of source address as somewhat akin to
the use of a CoA as the packet source address in MIPv6.
For the case of MIPv6, mobile nodes use the CoA to overcome ingress
filtering, and use the BU mechanism and Home Address Destination
Option to allow receivers to establish a relationship between the
source address (i.e. CoA) and the HoA. In the ARO Solution,
receivers can use the algorithm depicted in Figure 9 of Section 5.2
to establish a similar relationship between the source address (in
this case, the CoA/HoA of an upstream access router) and the HoA.
8.2.2 Alternatives
There are alternatives to changing source address for the purpose of
overcoming ingress filters. One method is to use packet
encapsulation to achieve the same effect as changing of source
address (since the outer packet has a different source address).
Currently, evaluating such a scheme is in progress.
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9. Security Considerations
This proposal introduces several modifications to existing protocols.
In this section, we will discuss additional security issues that
arise due to these modifications.
9.1 Addition of Access Router Option
Access Router Option is introduced so that a recipient can establish
a credible link between the global address of the access router
specified, and the HoA of the mobile node that sends the Access
Router Option.
When a mobile node sends BU to its HA, current MIPv6 draft specifies
that the BU should be secured (either by ESP or AH). For this case,
the introduction of Access Router Option does not introduce new
security threats.
When sending BU to CN, the mobile node inserts the Access Router
Option only when sending the actual BU message. The BU message is
protected using a key generated after obtaining the Care-of-Test
(CoT) and Home-Test (HoT) messages, so the Access Router Option
should be relatively secure. However, there exist the slight
possibility of an attacker snooping on both the CoT and HoT messages,
thus allowing the attacker to generate the key independently. The
attacker can then proceed to change the values in the Access Router
Option and change the Authenticator value of the BU message using the
generated key, thus leading the correspondent node to believe that
the mobile node is attached to another access router.
To overcome this, the mobile node may insert the Access Router Option
when sending the CoT Init Message. The ARO-enabled CN, should then
generate the care-of cookie using
Care-of cookie = First64(MAC_Kcn(CoA | access router address |
nonce))
instead of using only the CoA and nonce. In this way, the global
address of the access router in the Access Router Option is protected
the same way the CoA is protected.
Note that if the CN does not recognize the Access Router Option, it
will not use the access router address to generate the
care-of-cookie. However, we do not require the mobile node to change
the way the Authenticator value is generated, i.e. the value is
generated using the method as specified in MIPv6 [1]:
Kbu = Hash(home cookie | care-of cookie)
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Authenticator = MAC_Kbu(CoA | CN address | BU)
So, the BU will be verified to be authentic by the CN regardless of
how the care-of cookie is generated, provided the generation of
care-of cookie is consistent. The mobile node must still request for
BA so that it if the CN has accepted the Access Router Option.
9.2 Router Global Address Option
The introduction of global address of the access router in the BU
message is the crux of the ARO Solution, since this is the link which
allows HA and CN to set up the RH2 and to accept packets from
otherwise unknown sources. From previous discussion, the global
address of the access router is fairly secure since
o BU sent by an away node to its home agent that contains the access
router's global address is secure, and
o BU sent to CN are reasonably protected using the Return
Routability Procedure.
The weakest link is now the method in which the mobile node learns
the global address of the access router it attaches to. The method
proposed in this memo is to use the Router Advertisement. Two
possible security threats are identified here:
1. a malicious access router advertising false global address in the
RA messages it broadcasts, and
2. an attacker replays a RA message from a legitimate access router,
but changes the global address contained in the Router Global
Address Option to a false entry.
The severity of the two threats is yet to be fully analyzed. We do
provide our initial analysis here to invite further discussion. For
the first case, advertising a false global address is believed to be
one of least harm a malicious access router could do. There are
other far more potent threats faced by the mobile router when it
attaches itself to a malicious access router. For the second case
where an attacker replays a modified RA, we believed that the threat
existed in IPv6 Neighbor Discovery [11]. In [11], security issues
pertaining to RA are discussed. This discussion should be able to
shed some light on how to advert such an attack.
9.3 Accepting Tunnel with a Source Address not Directly Bound to the
Home Address
MIPv6 forbids home agent from accepting tunnels with a source address
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that is not bound to the HoA specified in a Home Address Option.
This proposal relaxed this security measure. The home agent should
now admit tunnels from a source address that is "indirectly" bound
(through the linkage of access router field in the binding cache) to
the home-address specified in the Home Address Option. The algorithm
presented in Figure 9 of Section 5.2 can be used to verify if the
source address is "indirectly" bound to the HoA specified in the Home
Address Option.
As considered above in Section 8.2, the Access Router Option is
secured by the fact that a BU to the HA is always secure. In
addition, the Access Router Option is fairly secured with the Return
Routability Procedure. Thus the relaxation of the security measure
of source address verification of a tunnel does not significantly
increase the HA's vulnerability to attacks. It is also recommended
that the tunnel between the mobile node and the home agent to be
secured by ESP or AH. In addition, we also recommend that all
implementations to allow the support of this ARO Solution to be
administratively disabled or enabled. The default should be enabled.
9.4 Use of Extended Routing Header Type 2
The extension of the RH2 exposes this solution to additional security
threats in that attackers can change the entries in the RH2 to be
routed to another entity. However, we note that this extension is
designed so that the extended RH2 is now very similar to the Type 0
Routing Header. Thus, the security threats faced by RH2 is not a new
threat introduced by this solution itself. In any case, the harm an
attacker can do by changing the entries in the routing header is
limited to:
o causing the packet to be routed to another entity for snooping
into the contents of the payloads;
o denial-of-service attack causing the packet to be discarded by
intermediate routers; and
o using the RH2 to reflect packets off a mobile network.
In the first two cases, given that the attacker has the ability to
change the contents in the routing header, it can perform the same
attack even if a RH2 is not used. For the threat where attacker
construct a RH2 to reflect packets off a mobile network, we recommend
that all routers supporting the RH2 to perform the following security
measures:
o When the mobile node receives a packet with the destination field
set to its HoA or CoA, it should check for the existence of a RH2.
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Any packet that is sent to the mobile node's CoA without a RH2
should be discarded.
o If the Segment Left field has a value of 1, the last address in
the routing header must contain the HoA of the mobile node.
o If the Segment Left field has a value greater than 1, the new
destination address must contain a valid address in one of the
mobile router's ingress links. If the mobile node is a mobile
host, the packet should be discarded.
Effectively, the above security checks ensure the mobile node will
discard any packets it received with a RH2 that requires it to
forward the packet through an egress link. This should reduce, if
not eliminate, the possibility of using the extended RH2 for
reflection attacks.
In addition, it must be noted that the extended RH2 is mutable but
predictable. Thus, it can be protected using AH.
9.5 Mutable Router Alert Option
The mutable Router Alert Option is used in this memo to request/stop
subsequent routers to attempt to forward the packet directly to its
destination. Possible security threats identified are:
The attacker can add a NEMO-Fwd RAO to a packet. This will cause
subsequent mobile routers to perform BU with the destination.
When BU is successful, subsequent mobile routers will forward the
packets directly to the destination, causing the packet to be
discarded (due to failure of algorithm in Figure 9).
The attacker can add a NEMO-NoFwd RAO to a packet. This has no
effect, since the default behavior of processing a packet with
NEMO-NoFwd RAO at a mobile router is the same as the default
behavior of processing a packet without any RAO.
The attacker can change the value of the NEMO-Fwd RAO to a NEMO-
NoFwd RAO. The effect of this form of attack is to cause the
packet to be delivered sub-optimally (i.e. nested tunnels).
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The attacker can change the value of the NEMO-NoFwd RAO to a
NEMO-Fwd RAO. The effect of this form of attack is to cause
subsequent mobile routers to perform BU with the destination.
When BU is successful, subsequent mobile routers will forward the
packets directly to the destination, causing the packet to be
discarded (due to failure of algorithm in Figure 9).
All the security threats described above require the attacker to be
on the path of the packet route. In addition, the most severe effect
the attacker can achieve is causing packets to be discarded at the
receiver. Since the attacker must be on the path of the packet
route, the attacker can achieve the same effect by simply discarding
the intercepted packet. Thus, the use of mutable router alert option
described in this memo does not introduce any new security threats.
9.6 IPSec Processing
9.6.1 Processing of Extended Routing Header Type 2
As covered in Section 5.4.2, the extended RH2 is a mutable but
predictable header, thus the sender must ordered the fields in the
RH2 (and the destination address of the IPv6 header) as they will
appear at the final destination when generating the AH authentication
header.
9.6.2 Processing of Home Address Destination Option
As specified in MIPv6, the originator should use its HoA as the IPv6
source address in the IPv6 header, and place its CoA in the Home
Address field of the Home Address destination option, when generating
the AH authentication data.
The ARO Solution allows mobile routers to modify the source address
of the IPv6 Header, thus when the source address field may no longer
contain the CoA of the sender at the final destination.
All home agents MUST use the algorithm shown in Figure 9 of Section
5.2 to establish the authenticity of the source address. Once the
source address is verified, the source address field will be replaced
by the HoA specified in the Home Address destination option, and the
Home Address field of the Home Address destination option will be
replaced with the CoA of the sender. This CoA is obtained from the
receiver's BCE.
The above processing MUST be carried out before AH processing.
9.6.3 Processing of Mutable Router Alert Option
As described in Section 4.3.2, when the sender of a packet inserts a
NEMO-Fwd RAO or NEMO-BU RAO to the packet, the receiver always
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received the RAO modified to NEMO-NoFwd. Thus the mutable NEMO-Fwd
RAO is predictable. It is thus possible for the originator to use
NEMO-NoFwd RAO to generate the AH authentication data. However, it
is recommended that the RAO simply be left out of any IPSec
processing.
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10 References
[1] Johnson, D., Perkins, C. and J. Arkko, "Mobility Support in
IPv6", RFC 3775, June 2004.
[2] Devarapalli, V., "Network Mobility (NEMO) Basic Support
Protocol", draft-ietf-nemo-basic-support-03 (work in progress),
June 2004.
[3] Ernst, T., "Network Mobility Support Goals and Requirements",
draft-ietf-nemo-requirements-02 (work in progress), February
2004.
[4] Thubert, P., Molteni, M. and C. Ng, "Taxonomy of Route
Optimization models in the Nemo Context",
draft-thubert-nemo-ro-taxonomy-02 (work in progress), February
2004.
[5] Ernst, T. and H. Lach, "Network Mobility Support Terminology",
draft-ietf-nemo-terminology-01 (work in progress), February
2004.
[6] Partridge, C. and A. Jackson, "IPv6 Router Alert Option", RFC
2711, October 1999.
[7] Deering, S. and R. Hinden, "Internet Protocol, Version 6 (IPv6)
Specification", RFC 2460, December 1998.
[8] Kent, S. and R. Atkinson, "Security Architecture for the
Internet Protocol", RFC 2401, November 1998.
[9] Kent, S. and R. Atkinson, "IP Authentication Header", RFC 2402,
November 1998.
[10] Kent, S. and R. Atkinson, "IP Encapsulating Security Payload
(ESP)", RFC 2406, November 1998.
[11] Narten, T., Nordmark, E. and W. Simpson, "Neighbor Discovery
for IP Version 6 (IPv6)", RFC 2461, December 1998.
[12] Conta, A. and S. Deering, "Internet Control Message Protocol
(ICMPv6) for the Internet Protocol Version 6 (IPv6)
Specification", RFC 2463, December 1998.
[13] Arkko, J., Devarapalli, V. and F. Dupont, "Using IPsec to
Protect Mobile IPv6 Signaling Between Mobile Nodes and Home
Agents", RFC 3776, June 2004.
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Authors' Addresses
Chan-Wah Ng
Panasonic Singapore Laboratories Pte Ltd
Blk 1022 Tai Seng Ave #06-3530
Tai Seng Industrial Estate
Singapore 534415
SG
Phone: +65 65505420
EMail: cwng@psl.com.sg
Jun Hirano
Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd. (Panasonic)
5-3 Hikarino-oka
Yokosuka, Kanagawa 239-0847
JP
Phone: +81 46 840 5123
EMail: hirano.jun@jp.panasonic.com
Appendix A. Acknowledgement
The authors would like to express our sincere gratitude to Takeshi
Tanaka for his contribution to the initial version of this draft. In
addition, appreciation is also extended to Thierry Ernst, Pascal
Thubert, and various people in the NEMO WG who have given us valuable
comments.
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